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INTRODUCTION 
The international law field of teaching and scholarship focuses—and has long focused—
on the so-called “international legal system.”1 The system’s parts include international law, 
international courts, and international organizations, and those parts are held together by 
foundational principles such as those governing the sources of international law and state 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.2 
Notwithstanding its international legal system emphasis, international law teaching and 
scholarship frequently touches on national law, national courts and non-state actors. For 
example, it examines the status of international law in national courts and of non-state actors as 
both potential subjects of and contributors to the development of international law.3 But it is less 
common for international law teaching and scholarship to treat national law, national courts or 
non-state actors as playing independently important roles in global affairs, apart from any 
connection they may have with international law.4 
1 See, e.g., MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, RICHARD F. SCOTT, NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA & DANIEL BRADLOW, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed., Foundation Press, 2015); Dinah Shelton (ed.), 
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
(Oxford University Press, 2003). 
2 See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (8th ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2012) (“International law has the characteristics of a system, not just a random collection of rules: the basic 
constructs of personality, sources (including treaties), interpretation, and responsibility, provide a framework within 
which rules may be generated, applied and, increasingly, adjudicated upon.”). 
3 See, e.g., ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (Oxford University 
Press, 2011) (discussing national courts in the international legal system); Jean d’Aspremont (ed.), PARTICIPANTS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Routledge, 2011) (discussing non-state actors in the international legal system). 
4 But see, e.g., Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in Terence C. Halliday & 
Gregory Shaffer (eds.), TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Cambridge University Press, 2015) (developing concept 
of transnational legal ordering); TONYA L. PUTNAM, COURTS WITHOUT BORDERS: LAW, POLITICS, AND U.S. 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global 
Governance, 84 TULANE LAW REVIEW 67 (2009) (discussing not only relationship between national courts and 
international legal system, but also independent role of national courts in transnational dispute resolution and global 
governance). In addition, several casebooks take an approach that emphasizes not only international law and 
international courts, but also national law and national courts, as well as private norms and private forms of dispute 
resolution. See, e.g., DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III, MICHAEL D. RAMSEY & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK, 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3790940
 2 
 
 One of the enduring and important contributions of Philip Jessup’s Transnational Law5 is 
its challenge to this concept of the international legal system. Jessup does not challenge the 
concept on the ground that international law is not a system, as others have.6 Rather, he 
challenges it on what are essentially functionalist grounds. Rejecting the traditional doctrinal 
boundaries of the field of international law, his point of departure is a concern with “the 
problems of the world community”—not merely with “the relations of one nation (or state) to 
other nations (or states)” as the term “international” implies.7 He then asks: What are the rules 
that regulate these problems? The answer, he argues, is not only international law, but “all law 
which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers,” including national law and 
private norms.8 Jessup called this law “transnational law.”9 
 
 My argument in this chapter is that a further conceptual move would be helpful, from a 
concept of the “international legal system” to a concept of the “global legal system.” Jessup’s 
transnational law concept is a concept of law that reaches beyond international law. But we also 
need a concept of legal system that reaches beyond the international legal system—one that, 
unlike transnational law, encompasses not only the law that governs cross-border problems, but 
also courts and other national, international and private institutions that contribute to that same 
function. 
 
 The term “global legal system” is not new.10 But it is usually used without definition or 
with only abbreviated conceptual development. Moreover, scholars sometimes use the term 
 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW & PRACTICE (Wolters Kluwer, 2015); MATHIAS W. REIMANN, JAMES C. HATHAWAY ET AL., 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (West, 2013); and DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS (4th ed., Foundation Press, 2008). 
5 PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Yale University Press, 1956). 
6 For an overview of the systemic view of international law and a discussion of critiques of that view, see Eyal 
Benvenisti, The Conception of International Law as a Legal System, 50 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 393 (2008). 
7 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 1. 
8 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 2. 
9 See JESSUP, supra note 5, at 2 (“I shall use instead of ‘international law,’ the term ‘transnational law’ to include all 
law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.”). 
10 See, e.g., GIULIANA ZICCARDI CAPALDO, THE PILLARS OF GLOBAL LAW XVI (Routledge, 2008) (examining four 
pillars of the global legal system, including verticality and sharing of decisional processes, legality principles and 
common global values, integration of legal systems, and collective guarantees); Oren Perez, Purity Lost: The 
Paradoxical Face of the New Transnational Legal Body, 33 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 3-4 
(2007); Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 109, 121 (2005); Eve Darian-Smith, Structural Inequalities in the Global Legal System, 34 LAW & 
SOCIETY REVIEW 809 (2000); Mohamed S. Helal, Justifying War and the Limits of Humanitarianism, 37 FORDHAM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 551, 555 (2014); Sung-Soo Han, A Study on the Development of a Global 
Community from a Legal Perspective, 7 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT 
REVIEW 71, 72 (2010); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 999, 1007 (2004); 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 
(2003); ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton University Press, 2004); Chris Thornhill, The 
Global Legal System and the Procedural Construction of Constituent Power, 5 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 405 
(2016); Paul Schiff Berman, From Legal Pluralism to Global Legal Pluralism, in: Richard Nobles & David Schiff 
(eds.), LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 255 (2014). 
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“global law” in a way that includes courts and other institutions beyond legal rules.11 Indeed, the 
concept of a global legal system is implicit in Jessup’s Transnational Law. It includes 
discussions of national courts and arbitration, and of conflict-of-laws rules, which, as I will 
suggest below, play a central role in what I am calling the global legal system. But these 
discussions fit uncomfortably within Jessup’s concept of transnational law, which is defined in 
terms of rules. A clear concept of the global legal system can accommodate and make explicit 
these important implications of Jessup’s work. 
 
 In this chapter, I outline my concept of the global legal system and attempt to lay out a 
coherent and parsimonious framework for understanding and analyzing it. To preview: The 
global legal system consists of institutions that provide legal solutions to transnational problems. 
These institutions are national, international, private, and sometimes hybrid. Among the types of 
solutions provided by the global legal system are three generic governance functions: 
prescription, adjudication and enforcement. Often more than one institution may provide 
solutions to a given transnational legal problem, creating a need for choice across three 
dimensions: national-national, national-international, and public-private. The global legal system 
uses three types of principles to guide these choices: principles of authority, principles of 
allocation, and principles of party autonomy. These are among the principles that hold the global 
legal system together, in spite of its high degree of decentralization. 
 
I. TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEMS: FUNCTION AND POLITICS 
 
 The global legal system is the system of laws, courts and other institutions that provide 
legal solutions to transnational problems. This is a functional understanding of the global legal 
system, and it follows Jessup’s functional understanding of transnational law.12 His emphasis 
throughout is not on actions or events as such, but on problems and the law that can be used to 
solve them. As he puts it on the first page of Transnational Law, he is interested in “analyzing 
the problems of the world community and the law regulating them.”13 And each of the three 
main parts of the book is explicitly focused on problems for which he explores legal solutions: 
“The Universality of the Human Problems,” “The Power to Deal with the Problems,” and “The 
Choice of Law Governing the Problems.” 
 
 So to understand what transnational law is—and what the global legal system does—we 
need to understand what transnational problems are. Jessup defined transnational problems very 
broadly. Transnational problems are problems that arise out of any “actions or events that 
transcend national frontiers.”14 They are the problems faced by the “world community,” which 
“begin[s] with the individual and reach[es] on up to the so-called ‘family of nations’ or ‘society 
 
11 One of the most comprehensive accounts of “global law” to date is GIULIANA ZICCARDI CAPALDO, THE PILLARS 
OF GLOBAL LAW (Routledge, 2008). 
12 See JESSUP, supra note 5, at 71 (referring to “the function of transnational law”). See also Gralf-Peter Calliess, 
Transnational Law, in Helmut K. Anheier & Mark Juergensmeyer (eds.), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL STUDIES 
(SAGE Publications, 2012) (“Generally speaking, Jessup’s approach to transnational law can be categorized as a 
functional one.”). 
13 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 1. 
14 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 2. 
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of states.’”15 “The problems in general,” he explains, “arise from conflicts of interest or desire, 
real or imagined.”16 
 
 This definition of transnational problems reflects Jessup’s claim that it is arbitrary to 
focus narrowly on international (that is, nation-to-nation) problems alone. Jessup was concerned 
with the problems faced by the “world community” more broadly. He argued that “the term 
‘international’ is misleading, since it suggests that one is concerned only with the relations of one 
nation (or state) to other nations (or states).”17 For Jessup, transnational problems can involve 
“individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups.”18 And he emphasized 
that the problems of interest to him are “after all merely human problems which might arise at 
any level of human society—individual, corporate, interregional, or international.”19 
 
 Some have criticized Jessup’s definition of transnational law as too broad to be useful 
because transnational problems are so pervasive that arguably every problem today is 
transnational.20 A global legal system paradigm inspired by Jessup’s notion of transnational 
problems might be susceptible to the same criticism. But Jessup deliberately left his definition 
open, suggesting that it is best to “avoid further classification of transnational problems and 
further definitions of transnational law.”21 This open approach is sensible. Comparative legal 
scholars have criticized functionalism in comparative law for its tendency to assume that all 
societies face similar problems that define the function of law.22 It would also seem reasonable to 
resist too much generalizing about what those problems are in a functional approach to the global 
legal system. Moreover, human problems evolve over time. Cross-societal and inter-temporal 
variation in human problems makes it unwise, perhaps even impossible, to specify a priori what 
transnational problems are. 
 
 Perhaps most important is something that Jessup did not emphasize in Transnational 
Law: The definition of transnational problems can be highly political. Different individuals and 
groups can disagree about what constitutes a problem and how that problem should be defined.23 
Because legal solutions almost inevitably have distributional consequences or reflect different 
normative values, there is contestation over whether particular phenomena count as transnational 
problems. The production of legal solutions depends largely on how this contestation is 
 
15 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 1. 
16 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 11. 
17 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 1. 
18 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 3. 
19 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 15-16. It is interesting that Jessup’s insistence on a non-state-centric view came more than 
a decade before a similar move in U.S. political science in the 1970s to include the study of “transnational relations” 
alongside international relations. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Robert O. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World 
Politics: An Introduction, 25 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 329 (1971). 
20 See Christian Tietje & Karsten Nowrot, Laying Conceptual Ghosts of the Past to Rest: The Rise of Philip C. 
Jessup’s ‘Transnational Law’ in the Regulatory Governance of the International Economic System, in: Christian 
Tietje, Alan Brouder & Karsten Nowrot (eds.), TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVISITED: ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF ITS PUBLICATION 17, 30 (2006) (describing, but not endorsing, this critique) (available at 
http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft50.pdf). 
21 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 7. 
22 See Christopher A. Whytock, Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law, 2009 BRIGHAM 
YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1879, 1886 (2009) (discussing these criticisms). 
23 Id. at 1889-90. 
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resolved—and how it is resolved may be strongly influenced by the global distribution of power 
among states and between states and non-state actors.24 
 
 Therefore, to define the concept of the global legal system, I suggest a broad, 
functionalist concept of transnational problems similar to Jessup’s: Transnational problems are 
problems that concern more than one state or persons of different nationalities. Defined this way, 
transnational problems include not only international problems, but also problems relevant to 
non-state actors. It must be a realistic functionalist concept that avoids excessive generalization 
and recognizes the politics of transnational problems. 
 
II. LEGAL SOLUTIONS AND GENERIC GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS 
 
 If the first step toward defining the concept of a global legal system is to define 
transnational problems, the next step is to understand the nature of legal solutions to those 
problems. Jessup suggests that as human problems change and grow, there is growing demand 
for legal solutions to those problems: “As man has developed his needs and his facilities for 
meeting his needs, the rules become more numerous and more complicated.”25 Transnational law 
is the field of law that provides those solutions. Thus, as Jessup puts it, transnational law 
“suppl[ies] a…storehouse of rules on which to draw” to solve transnational problems.26 
 
 Like problem-definition, it is important not to pretend that the definition of solutions is 
apolitical. Which solutions are proposed and adopted will often be politically contested and 
influenced by power. It also is important not to pretend that legal solutions are necessarily 
effective in the sense that they actually solve the transnational problems to which they are 
addressed. The effect of a legal solution is an empirical question that poses difficult challenges of 
causal inference—and whether a particular effect makes a solution a “success” is likely to be as 
politically contested as the definition of the transnational problem and the selection of a solution 
in the first place.27 What might be a success to one group could be viewed by another group as a 
failure or as making a problem worse. Even more fundamentally, law alone cannot of course 
solve all (or even most) transnational problems. Therefore, it is best not to think of legal 
solutions as necessarily effective, but rather to think of them as potential solutions to be assessed 
based on evidence. 
 
 Jessup made no effort to catalog transnational problems in detail, and he made no effort 
to list the solutions offered by transnational law, either. Yet it is helpful to think about solutions 
to transnational problems at a very general level, with a focus on a trio of generic governance 
functions: prescription (the making of rules), adjudication (the authoritative resolution of 
disputes), and enforcement (namely, the enforcement of rules and the outcomes of 
adjudication).28 These generic functions may help address many different transnational problems, 
 
24 This contestation may occur national and transnationally. See generally Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 4. 
25 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 8. 
26 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 15. 
27 See generally Christopher A. Whytock, Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law, 2009 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1879 (2009). 
28 See ANNE METTE KJAER, GOVERNANCE (Polity Press, 2004) (defining governance as “governance is “the setting 
of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules”). These functions roughly correspond to the three 
types of authority addressed by the customary international law of jurisdiction. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES 
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ranging from transnational crime to cross-border environmental harm, and from human rights 
abuses to international child custody disputes. They are not the only functions, but they are a 
good point of departure for thinking about the functions of the global legal system.29 
 
III. SUPPLIERS OF LEGAL SOLUTIONS: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE GLOBAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
 The next step in honing the concept of a global legal system is to ask: Who supplies legal 
solutions? Jessup emphasized that the suppliers of transnational law include not only states, but 
also international organizations and private actors. He includes in his concept of transnational 
law rules made by “ecclesiastical authorities,” corporations, “secret societies,” towns, cities, 
states, and international organizations.30 
 
 Likewise, the suppliers of legal solutions in the global legal system include not only 
states, but also other institutions. These institutions can be differentiated functionally (Table 1) 
and organizationally (Table 2). Functionally, there are institutions that correspond to each of the 
generic functions of the global legal system: institutions that prescribe rules (e.g. legislatures and 
sometimes courts), institutions that adjudicate (e.g. courts and private dispute resolution bodies, 
such as arbitral tribunals), and institutions that enforce (e.g. groups of nations or private groups 
















 Organizationally, the institutions of the global legal system include national institutions 
(e.g. national legislatures and national courts), international institutions (e.g. the United Nations), 
and private institutions (e.g. private rule-making bodies and private dispute resolution bodies, 
 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd. ed., West, 2012), 313-344 (discussing jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to 
adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce). 
29 See, e.g., LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED 
PERSPECTIVE (Oxford University Press, 2015) (identifying seven functions of the international legal system: the 
intelligence (information) function, the promoting function, the prescribing (lawmaking) function, the invoking 
function, the applying function, the terminating function, and the appraising function). 
30 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 8-9. In this way, Jessup’s concept of transnational law can be considered a precursor to 
the concept of global legal pluralism. See generally Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANNUAL REVIEW OF 
LAW & SOCIAL SCIENCE 1-35 (2009); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW 1155 (2007). 
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such as arbitral institutions). Often, institutions are hybrid, with a combination of prescriptive, 
adjudicative and enforcement functions, or a combination of national, international and private 
elements.  
 
 There are also subsystems of the global legal system. Subsystems vary by participants 
and the types of problems they address. National legal systems are subsystems in which 
participation is limited to a given state. International legal subsystems often have a limited 
number of participating states, with those limits often defined regionally (e.g. the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights), and many are focused on particular types of problems (e.g. the 
















 The global legal system is highly decentralized—so decentralized that some might 
hesitate to call it a “system” at all.31 Needless to say, there is no global court or global 
legislature. However, centralization is not necessary for a system to exist.32 Rather, centralization 
is a variable, such that a system can be more or less centralized (or more or less fragmented). In 
any event, some subsystems of the global legal system are quite centralized (e.g. most national 
legal systems and, one might add, the European Union). Most fundamentally, there are legal 
rules that are part of the global legal system that contribute to the coordination of its different 
parts, including national (and, increasingly, international) conflict-of-laws rules; public 
international law’s principles of jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce; the national and 
international law of arbitration; and the host of principles that govern the relationships between 
 
31 The status of international law as a system has been widely discussed, along with the implications of 
fragmentation for that status. See, e.g., JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press, 2009); International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, UC Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (Aug. 11, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi). 
32 Cf. Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo, Managing Complexity within the Unit of the Circular Web of the Global Law 
System: Representing a “Communal Spider Web,” 1 GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & 
JURISPRUDENCE xxi (2011) (affirming that “[t]he global law system is highly fragmented” but nevertheless treating 
it as a system). 
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different rules of international law (such as the maxims of lex specialis derogat legi generali and 
lex posterior derogat legi priori and the concept of jus cogens norms).33 
 
IV. LEGAL RULES: BEYOND TRADITIONAL DOCTRINAL DISTINCTIONS 
 
 One type of legal solution provided by the institutions of the global legal system is the 
production of legal rules—that is, prescription, which is one of the generic functions of the 
global legal system. Nations create national law. Acting together, nations create international 
law, including customary international law and treaty law. And private actors also create rules. 
All three types of rules are part of transnational law, according to Jessup. 
 
 This conception of transnational law was—and to a significant degree still is—innovative 
in several ways.34 First, it challenges the distinction between national law and international law. 
As Jessup argued, “the line between the international and the national should be questioned as a 
basis for legal classification….”35 The distinction may in many situations be doctrinally relevant, 
but from Jessup’s functional perspective, the essential commonality is that both national law and 
international law can provide potential solutions to transnational problems. Second, Jessup 
challenged the distinction between public international law and private international law. 
According to Jessup, “[b]oth public and private international law are included” in the concept of 
transnational law.36 Third, Jessup didn’t hesitate to include private rules in his definition of 
transnational law.37  
 
 It is not obvious whether to include concepts like “soft law” and “non-state law” in the 
concept of a global legal system. On the one hand, there are good reasons to reserve the term 
“law” for rules that are produced by a recognized lawmaking process—such as those defined in a 
national constitution or international law’s doctrine of sources—and intended to be legally 
binding in the sense that a court would consider them to be binding rules of decision in 
adjudication. Legal scholars and social scientists have long sought to understand what is 
distinctive about law. Normatively, is there a difference between legal obligations and other 
types of obligations? Behaviorally, do legal rules affect behavior in ways that are systematically 
different from other types of rules? And how do legal rules affect, and how are they affected by, 
non-legal rules?38 But if one conflates legal and non-legal rules into a single concept of law, this 
type of analysis is not possible. 
 
 
33 Cf. International Law Commission, supra note 31, at 7 (noting that notwithstanding fragmentation, international 
law is a system due largely to these and other principles of international law). 
34 For an overview of the concept, its evolution, and its adoption by different theoretical schools of international law, 
see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS ch. 1 (Thomson 
Reuters/Foundation Press, 2008). 
35 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 70. 
36 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 2. 
37 He downplayed this move, saying that “[n]owadays it is neither novel nor heretical to call all of these rules ‘law.’” 
JESSUP, supra note 5, at 9. But actually, this may have been one of the more novel aspects of Jessup’s concept at the 
time. 
38 See Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLITICS 699, 701 (2000) (arguing that one of the most important questions for political scientists and 
policy makers is whether “legal norms, as a type, operate differently from any other kinds of norms in world 
politics”). 
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 On the other hand, so-called “soft law” and non-state law play a crucial role in solving 
transnational problems, as Jessup emphasized.39 They are also so closely linked to legally 
binding rules as to make it difficult to consider the role of one without the other.40 For example, 
non-legally binding and private rules may influence the development of law, and private rules 
that take the form of, or are incorporated into, contracts may be legally enforceable as a matter of 
contract law. And from Jessup’s functional perspective, the differences between legally binding 
rules, non-legally binding rules and private rules are not as fundamental as what they all have in 
common: They are all potential solutions to transnational problems. I therefore include non-
legally binding rules and private rules as among the rules of the global legal system; but in an 
effort to avoid the analytical problems posed by conflating them with law, I do not use the terms 
“soft law” or “non-state law” to describe them.  
 
V. DIMENSIONS OF CHOICE 
 
 An important implication of a global legal system concept based on Jessup’s functionalist 
concept of transnational law is that a wide variety of legal solutions may be available for a given 
transnational problem. As Jessup explains: 
 
There are rules, or there is law, bearing upon [transnational problems]. There may be a 
number of applicable legal rules and they may conflict with each other. When this is the 
case, still other rules may determine which law prevails. In certain types of situations we 
may say this is a question of “choice of law” which is to be determined by the rules of 
“Conflict of Laws” or “Private International Law.” The choice usually referred to here is 
between rules of different national laws; and the choice, we assume, is to be made by a 
national court. In other types of situations the choice may be between a rule of national 
law and a rule of “Public International Law,” and the choice may be made by a national 
tribunal or by some nonjudicial decision maker.41 
 
In other words, since nations, international institutions, and private actors can all provide legal 
solutions to transnational problems, there are multiple dimensions to choosing a legal solution 
(see Figure 1). First, will a national or international solution be used? Second, will a national or 
private solution be used? Third, will an international or private solution be used?42 And beyond 
these three basic dimensions, there are others: between multiple national solutions, international 




39 See, e.g., DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Oxford University Press, 2003) (on non-binding rules) and TIM BÜTHE & WALTER 
MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Princeton 
University Press, 2011) (on private forms of governance). 
40 See Christopher A. Whytock, Private-Public Interaction in Global Governance: The Case of Transnational 
Commercial Arbitration, 12:3 BUSINESS & POLITICS (2010).  
41 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 4-5. 
42 See Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, supra note 4. 









 These dimensions intersect with the three generic functions of prescription, adjudication 
and enforcement (Table 3).43 Which rules should be applied? Which court or other body should 
adjudicate? Who should enforce? And for each of these generic governance functions, the 
questions are: Which nation? National or international? Private or public? To understand the 




43 See Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, supra note 4. As noted above, there are of course other 
functions of the global legal system. For example, both the Human Rights Council’s universal periodic review 
process (at the international level) and nongovernmental human rights organizations (at the private level) perform 
what Chen calls an “intelligence” function, a function that does not fit neatly into the category of prescription, 
adjudication, or enforcement. Cf. CHEN, supra note 29 (listing the UN Human Rights Council’s reporting system as 
an example of the “intelligence” function.).  





























































VI. METHODS OF CHOICE 
 
 But how are these choices made? Whether through national law, public international law 
or private international law, argued Jessup, one “function of transnational law [is] to reshuffle the 
cases and to deal out jurisdiction in the manner most conducive to the needs and convenience of 
all members of the international community.”44 The global legal system uses three basic methods 
to guide choices across these dimensions: authority, allocation, and party autonomy. First, a 
choice may be included or excluded from consideration based on whether the supplier has the 
authority to apply a particular solution. This method is most familiar in public international law, 
a branch of which provides principles limiting the jurisdiction of states to prescribe, adjudicate 
and enforce. A given nation either has or lacks authority to prescribe, adjudicate or enforce. 
 
 Second, a choice may be made based on rules of allocation. The question is not whether a 
given supplier has authority, but rather which solution among several will be applied to a 
transnational problem. Ordinarily, this method assumes—implicitly or explicitly—that the 
suppliers of the solutions under consideration have the requisite authority, and in that way 
authority and allocation are related.45 Perhaps the most familiar example of allocation as a 
 
44 JESSUP, supra note 5, at 71. 
45 See Christopher A. Whytock, Toward a New Dialogue Between Conflict of Laws and International Law, 110 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 150 (2016). 
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method of choice is the choice-of-law branch of conflict of laws (or “private international law”), 
which attempts to guide judges and lawyers in figuring out which state’s law to apply.46 
 
 Third, a choice may be made not based on rules of authority or allocation, but instead 
based on party autonomy.47 The most common examples are choice-of-law clauses in contracts, 
whereby parties choose a particular nation’s law (or even rules other than national law, such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts), or dispute resolution clauses, 
whereby parties choose a particular nation’s courts or a private dispute resolution method such as 
arbitration. There can also be some degree of party autonomy regarding enforcement, such as 












Customary International Law Principles of 





Choice-of-Law Branch of Conflict of Laws 




Choice-of-Law and Forum Selection Clauses 
 
 
 The branch of law that most explicitly deals with choice—conflict of laws—deals 
primarily with the international dimension (and, to a lesser extent, with the private-public 
dimension).48 For example, choice of law deals with which nation’s law to apply, not whether to 
apply national law or international law. But each nation has domestic rules that help determine 
when one of its courts will apply international law rather than national law, which is an example 
of the national-international dimension; and most nations have rules that help determine when 
 
46 See ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW (Cambridge University Press , 
2009) and Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, supra note 4 (discussing allocation of governance 
authority by conflict of laws). 
47 See ALEX MILLS, PARTY AUTONOMY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2018). Of 
course, rules governing party autonomy also can be understood as involving allocation—namely, allocation between 
state and private authority. 
48 Conflict of laws can also deal with choice among the governmental subunits of federal systems (e.g. among U.S. 
states in the U.S. federal system). 
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one of its courts will enforce a choice-of-law or forum selection clause, which is an example of 
the private-public dimension.  
 
 These methods of choice are important in legal practice, yet they are contested and vary 
significantly across legal systems. The future development of the global legal system will thus 
depend largely on the further development of rules of authority, allocation, and party autonomy. 
But the choices themselves are not merely legal, but also political: They distribute governance 
power among states, between national and international institutions, and between private and 
public actors. For this reason, these choices—like the definition of problems and the evaluation 
of solutions—inevitably have a political aspect. 
 
VII. FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
TO LAW AND WORLD POLITICS 
 
 The global legal system concept can benefit teaching, legal practice, and scholarship by 
providing a coherent way of thinking about the multiple transnational problem-solving functions 
of a legal system (including prescription, adjudication and enforcement) and the multiple levels 
at which those functions are performed (including national, international and private). For 
teaching, the global legal system concept can help train students to identify legal solutions 
without limiting themselves to national (or international) law. For lawyers, it can offer a coherent 
way to make sense of the complex legal environment in which they try to help clients solve their 
transnational problems.  
 
 For scholars, it puts in focus a wide range of questions about coordination among the 
different institutions of the global legal system, and about the appropriate roles of authority, 
allocation and party autonomy in the choice of legal solutions to transnational problems. And it 
helps to highlight weaknesses—such as the relative underdevelopment of principles for 
allocating between national and international solutions, among different international solutions, 
and between national and private solutions. The global legal system concept also brings into 
focus questions about contestation over the definition of transnational problems, the design of 
legal solutions, the measurement of outcomes, the assessment of solutions, and the legal and 
political determinants of decisions regarding the allocation and exercise of national, international 
and private authority to govern transnational problems. 
 
 More broadly, the global legal system concept implies a move away from the current 
international law and international relations (IL/IR) paradigm in interdisciplinary international 
law scholarship.49 As its label suggests, IL/IR research tends to be state-centric and focuses 
primarily on international law and international courts. It therefore tends to neglect the two other 
principal dimensions of the global legal system—the national and the private. 
 
 But interdisciplinary scholarship is increasingly taking what I call a “law and world 
politics” (L/WP) approach.50 Moving beyond the somewhat narrow focus on international law 
 
49 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack (eds.), INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 50 See Christopher A. Whytock, From International Law and International Relations to Law and World Politics, in: 
William R. Thompson (ed.), OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICS (Oxford University Press, 2018). 
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and international courts indicated by the “IL” in IL/IR scholarship, L/WP scholars are bringing 
national law and national courts into the analysis, shedding light not only on how they support 
(and sometimes undermine) international law and international courts, but also on their direct 
role in core areas of international relations, such as international conflict and foreign policy. 
Moving beyond the state-centric tendencies reflected by the “IR” in IL/IR scholarship, scholars 
are bringing research on law up to speed with the broader world politics trend in political science 
by studying aspects of law—including extraterritoriality, conflict of laws, private international 
law, and the law of transnational commercial arbitration—that govern the transnational activity 
of private actors and that support (and sometimes undermine) private governance. And moving 
beyond the domestic-international divide, political scientists are increasingly rejecting the 
traditional distinction between “hierarchical” domestic law and “anarchical” international law, 
and beginning to take advantage of theoretical convergence across the domestic, comparative 
and international politics subfields to develop a better general understanding of law and politics 
that does not rely on the traditional hierarchy/anarchy distinction.51 
 
 This L/WP trend in interdisciplinary scholarship is consistent with (and might even seem 
necessary) from the perspective of Jessup’s functionalist concept of transnational law. It 
promises to provide a richer understanding of the global legal system than a largely state-centric 
approach that revolves primarily around international law and international courts. 
 
 
51 See Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide: Toward a Unified Concept of 
Public Law, 36 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (2004) and Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher 
A. Whytock, The Politics of International Law, in Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher A Whytock (eds.), RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 14-17 (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017). See also Daryl J. 
Levinson & Jack L. Goldsmith, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law. 122 HARVARD 
LAW REVIEW 1791-1868 (2009); Shalev Roisman, Constraining States: Constitutional Lessons for International 
Courts, 55:3 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 729-782 (2015); and Jeffrey K. Staton & Will H. Moore, 
Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics, 65 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 553-587 (2011). 
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